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COMMENT
Punitive Damages and Double Jeopardy:
A Critical Perspective of the Taber Rule
DOYAL E. MCLEMORE, JR.*
Few protections are so established in Anglo-American law as that
which prohibits putting a man twice in jeopardy for the same offense.'
To avoid violating safeguards against the imposition of double jeopardy,
*B.A. 1974, Indiana University at Fort Wayne; J.D. 1977, Indiana University School of
Law, Bloomington. Staff Counsel for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, New Orleans. The author of this comment prepared the Brief for Appellant (filed Feb.
4, 1979) in McCarty v. Sparks, - Ind. App. -, 388 N.E.2d 296 (1979), a recent opinion
which called for a re-examination of the Taber rule by either the Indiana Supreme Court or
legislature. The ideas contained in this comment are taken from that brief.
U.S. CONST. amend. V, provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment by a Grand Jury, except in cases aris-
ing in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time
of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
IND. CONST. art. I, § 14, reads: "No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same of-
fense. No person, in any criminal prosecution, shall be compelled to testify against himself."
Virtually every state constitution contains a similar protection against the imposition of
double jeopardy. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 9; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 9; ARIZ. CONST. art. II,
§ 10; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13, cl. 4; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 18; DEL.
CONST. art. I, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; GA. CONST. § 2-115; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 8;
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 12; KAN. CONST. Bill
of Rights, § 10; Ky. CONST. § 13; LA. CONST. art. I, § 15; ME. CONST. art. I, § 8; MICH. CONST.
art. I, § 15; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7: MIss. CONST. art. 3, § 22; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 19; MONT.
CONST. art. II, § 25; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 12; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 16; N.J. CONST. art. I,
11; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 13; OHIO CONST.
art. I, § 10; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 21; OR. CONST. art. I, § 12; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10; S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 12; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 10; TEX. CONST. art. I, §
14; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9; W. VA. CONST.
art. III, § 5; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8; Wyo. CONST. art. 1, § 11. Nevertheless, the double
jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution has been held to be a direct limitation on
the states. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-95 (1969).
The reasons underlying this protection against double jeopardy were articulated in Ex
Parte Bradley, 48 Ind. 548 (1874):
[O]ur constitution provides, that "no person shall be put in jeopardy twice for
the same offense:' This humane and benign provision of our fundamental law
was borrowed from the common law and magna charta. Every person ac-
quainted with the history of governments must know that state trials have
been employed as a formidable engine in the hands of a dominant administra-
tion, and that ... those who had been acquitted of all crime, under a former
reign, might be subjected anew to prosecution, and that a despot, by frequently
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Indiana prevents tort claimants from seeking punitive damages when a
defendant is subject to the possibility of criminal prosecution for the
tort.2 Although this so-called Taber rule, which was created by the Indi-
ana Supreme Court in 1854, has been a part of Indiana jurisprudence for
over one hundred and twenty-five years, only limited examination of it
has been undertaken.' Recent appellate opinions, however, have invited
the Indiana Supreme Court and legislature to examine the established
rule.4 The suggestion underlying such an invitation is that the time has
come for the rule to be modified or even overruled. This comment will
arraigning and trying an accused political enemy, might ultimately put him
down, so that he could no longer annoy the existing power. To prevent these
mischiefs, the ancient common law, as well as the magna charta itself, pro-
vided that one acquittal or conviction should satisfy the law.... The framers
of the federal and state governments regarded the doctrine so important and
necessary that they incorporated the same principle in the fundamental law.
Every man accused of crime, who has been acquitted by the verdict of a jury
of the whole crime preferred against him, is shielded and protected by the con-
stitution.
Id- at 557 (citation omitted); accord, Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). See
generally Slovenko, The Law on Double Jeopardy, 30 TUL. L. REv. 409 (1955).
The term "jeopardy" has been defined so as to be limited in applicability to criminal pro-
secutions. As the Indiana Supreme Court declared in Armentrout v. State, 214 Ind. 273,
275, 15 N.E.2d 363, 364 (1938):
Jeopardy is the peril and danger to life or liberty in which a person is put
when he has been regularly and sufficiently charged with the commission of a
crime; has been arraigned and pleaded to such charge; has been put upon his
trial before a tribunal properly organized and competent to try him for the of-
fense charged, and a jury has been empanelled from persons competent to sit
on the trial and duly sworn to try the cause and charged with due deliverance.
The meaning of the term "offense" is also technically limited to criminal prosecutions.
State v. Shumaker, 200 Ind. 716, 724-25, 164 N.E. 408, 410-11 (1928); Cruthers v. State, 161
Ind. 139, 147, 67 N.E. 930, 932-33 (1903); IND. CODE § 35-41-1-2 (Supp. 1980). The double
jeopardy clause covers all offenses, be they misdemeanor or felony. Ex Parte Lange, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 169 (1874).
' See, e.g., Wabash Printing & Publishing Co. v. Crumrine, 123 Ind. 89, 21 N.E. 904
(1889); Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322 (1854); Moore v. Waitt, 157 Ind. App. 1, 298 N.E.2d 456
(1973); Cohen v. Peoples, 140 Ind. App. 353, 220 N.E.2d 665 (1966). Compare, e.g., Nicholson
v. Schramm, 164 Ind. App. 598, 330 N.E.2d 785 (1975) (noting three apparent exceptions to
Taber rule) with McCarty v. Sparks, - Ind. App. - , 388 N.E.2d 296 (1979) (apparent
exception for heedless disregard of consequences rejected).
Indiana is in the distinct minority of jurisdictions on this point. For contrary holdings,
see, e.g., Svejcara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1971); Harrell v. Ames,
265 Or. 183, 508 P.2d 211 (1973); Security Aluminum Window Mfg. Corp. v. Lehman Assocs.,
108 N.J. Super. 137, 260 A.2d 248 (1970).
' See generally McClellan, Exemplary Damages in Indiana, 10 IND. L.J. 275 (1935);
Note, 2 IND. L.J. 689 (1927); Note, 21 NOTRE DAME LAW. 206 (1946); see also Aldridge, The
Indiana Doctrine of Exemplary Damages and Double Jeopardy, 20 IND. L.J. 123 (1945)
(focus on legislative power to provide punitive damages when wrongdoers subject to
criminal prosecution).
' See McCarty v. Sparks, - Ind. App ... 388 N.E.2d 296, 297-98 (1979) (rule
"ripe for reconsideration"); Smith v. Mills, - Ind. App. -, - , 385 N.E.2d 1205, 1208
(1979) (rule no doubt should be reconsidered); Glissman v. Rutt, - Ind. App. -, .




review the reasoning behind the rule before articulating some reasons
why the invitation to examine it might justifiably be accepted.
HISTORY OF THE TABER RULE
The genesis of the rule can be traced directly to the decision of the In-
diana Supreme Court in Taber v. Hutson.' The plaintiff in that case
sought compensatory and punitive damages for an assault and battery.
After the trial court instructed the jury that punitive damages could be
awarded on the facts and the plaintiff prevailed, the defendant raised on
appeal the issue of whether punitive damages were proper. In holding
that they were not, the Indiana Supreme Court reasoned that a defen-
dant who is sued for a tort which is not a crime might properly be
assessed with exemplary damages, since such damages are the only
mode of imposing punishment for violating rights to personal security
or private property. However, the court declared that when a defendant
commits an assault and battery, or any tort which is also a crilne, puni-
tive damages should not be awarded because to do otherwise would
result in the possibility of
[the defendant being] twice punished for the same assault and bat-
tery. This would not accord with the spirit of our institutions. The
constitution declares, that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offence;" and though that provision may not relate to the
remedies secured by civil proceedings, still it serves to illustrate a
fundamental principle inculcated by every well-regulated system of
government, viz., that each violation of the law should be certainly
followed by one appropriate punishment and no more.'
Later cases confirm that a double jeopardy concern is at the heart of the
Taber prohibition.7 If punitive damages are awarded while the possibil-
ity of criminal punishment is outstanding, unnecessary punishment may
be inflicted. To prevent such an outcome, Taber and its progeny bar the
recovery of punitive damages altogether
The rationale of double jeopardy articulated in Taber under which
defendants are simply shielded from awards of exemplary damages in
tort if they are subject to the possibility of criminal prosecution for the
same act has remained basically intact up to the present. Several opin-
ions of the Indiana Supreme Court after the Taber decision have, how-
ever, implicitly criticized the double jeopardy rationale, drawing a
distinction between civil and criminal proceedings when applying prin-
8 5 Ind. 322 (1854).
8 Id. at 335-36.
See note 2 & accompanying text supra.See text accompanying notes 2, 6 supra.
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ciples of double jeopardy.' Indeed, the Taber opinion itself recognizes
The Indiana Supreme Court drew such a distinction in State ex rel. Beedle v.
Schoonover, 135 Ind. 526, 35 N.E. 119 (1893). Schoonover was a civil action in which the
plaintiff requested damages as a penalty under "an act to secure the purity and freedom of
the ballot." Id. at 527, 35 N.E. at 119. The defendant questioned the act's constitutionality
on double jeopardy grounds, among others, and argued that it had been repealed by a
similar criminal act. Both acts had been passed on March 9, 1889; the civil act, however, had
been passed first.
In discussing the constitutionality of the civil act when the criminal act made the same
conduct a crime, the court stated:
When the General Assembly convened, in 1889, vote buying and vote selling
were punishable alike, and convictions were extremely difficult .... The sanc-
tity of the ballot, the freedom and purity of our elections, were ... of para-
mount importance ... ; hence the one act provided for a civil penalty, and the
other for a criminal prosecution for the offense in question, so as to open every
avenue to its discovery....
It is true that Section 59, article 1, of the Bill of Rights provides that "No
person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense," but the jeopardy
mentioned is the peril of a second criminal prosecution for the same felony or
misdemeanor, and the liability named in [the civil act], is a civil penalty for a
tortious act, and not a debt.
Id at 530-31, 35 N.E. at 120. Thus, the civil act was held not to violate the double jeopardy
clause by authorizing a civil penalty for what was also a crime. Yet, in reaching this result,
the court drew a distinction between civil and criminal proceedings which should logically
be ignored if the double jeopardy rationale of Taber is to survive. Moreover, in reaching its
result, the court did not adequately explain why a "civil penalty for a tortious act" is not ajeopardy in the same sense that punitive damages or the possibility of criminal prosecution
are for the Taber rule.
The court next considered whether the criminal act impliedly repealed its civil counter-
part. Quoting State ex rel. Scobey v. Stevens, 103 Ind. 55, 65, 2 N.E. 214, 220 (1885), the
court found that the criminal act did not repeal the civil one:
Where ... a statute makes certain conduct a misdemeanor, and annexes to it a
prescribed fine to the State, and also provides that the worngdoer [sic] shall be
liable to the injured party in a fixed or limited sum, it is certain from the
beginning what the consequence may be, and there is no possibility that the
penalties may overlap each other so as to put him in jeopardy of being tried
twice, or suffering double the punishment prescribed for the same offense.
135 Ind. at 532-33, 35 N.E.2d at 121. But see Koerner v. Oberly, 56 Ind. 284 (1877). Lamen-
tably, the court does not say in principle how legislatively authorized damages "in a fixed
or limited sum" which exceed actual compensation and are intended as a penalty in fact dif-
fer from punitive damages. The decision's approval of the civil penalty is reached despite
the Taber rule's being required by "the spirit of our institutions." Further, the court
reaches its result despite the persuasive reasoning contained in Scobey, which was decided
only eight years before Schoonover:
If the provision that "no one shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same of-
fence" is, as this court has recognized it to be, a sure protection against the
power of the courts .... it must be deemed equally potential against the
power of the Legislature. It cannot be maintained in reason that it shall be in-
terpreted to mean that the courts cannot adjudge a second punishment for the
same offense except when expressly authorized by the Legislature, for the
reason that in so far as the Legislature attempts to authorize such second
punishment the barrier of the Constitution is as effectual against it as it is
against the court.
103 Ind. at 63, 2 N.E. at 219. But see Latshaw v. State ex rel. Latshaw, 156 Ind. 194, 201, 59
N.E. 471, 473 (1901).
[Vol. 56:71
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that the double jeopardy clause has no literal application to "the
Decided two years after Schoonover, State ex rel. Duensing v. Roby, 142 Ind. 168, 41
N.E. 145 (1895), raises further questions about the soundness of basing the Taber rule upon
principles of double jeopardy. Roby held that subjecting a defendant to criminal prosecu-
tion and enjoining criminal conduct does not violate double jeopardy. The case involved an
act which made unauthorized horse racing a crime. The same act also authorized a civil suit
against anyone violating its provisions and the issuance of an injunction against such viola-
tion. In its opinion, the Indiana Supreme Court considered the argument that the act
violated constitutional safeguards against double jeopardy:
It is insisted that the defendant may be punished by a fine on a criminal pros-
ecution and again made subject to an injunction and deprived of the use of his
property, thus punishing him twice for the same offense or act. But the civil
suit authorized by the act is not a criminal prosecution, and the injunction is
not a punishment within the meaning of the ... constitution .... But it is fur-
ther contended that in case of a violation of an injunction under the civil-
remedy part of the act the court might fine the defendant for contempt for
disobeying the order of injunction, and that would make him liable to double
punishment. The statement of that proposition furnishes a sufficient answer
thereto. In that case he would not be punished for crime, but for contempt of
court.
Id. at 188-89, 41 N.E. at 152 (citations omitted); accord, State v. Shumaker, 200 Ind. 716, 164
N.E. 408 (1928). The importance of the opinion, which did reach a correct result, lies never-
theless in the recognition that, when applying double jeopardy principles, "a civil suit" is
not a "criminal prosecution." Taken on its face, such broad reasoning undermines the Taber
rule, the integrity of which depends upon overlooking recognized differences between civil
and criminal proceedings.
Issues .similar to those confronted by these Indiana decisions have also been addressed
by the federal judiciary. In Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), for example, the
United States Supreme Court considered whether a tax penalty was forbidden by the
double jeopardy clause when criminal prosecution for tax fraud proved unsuccessful.
Justice Brandeis, for the majority, emphasized basic differences between civil and criminal
proceedings in concluding that double jeopardy was not violated by the tax penalty:
That Congress provided a distinctly civil procedure for the collection of [tax
penalties] indicates clearly that it intended a civil, not a criminal, sanction.
Civil procedure is incompatible with the accepted rules and constitutional
guaranties governing the trial of criminal prosecutions, and where civil pro-
cedure is prescribed for the enforcement of remedial sanctions, those rules
and guaranties do not apply. Thus the determination of the facts upon which
liability is based may be by an administrative agency instead of a jury, or if
the prescribed proceeding is in the form of a civil suit, a verdict may be
directed against the defendant; there is no burden upon the Government to
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and it may appeal from an adverse
decision; furthermore, the defendant has no constitutional right to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him, or to refuse to testify; and finally, in
the civil enforcement of a remedial sanction there can be no double jeopardy.
Id. at 402-04 (footnotes omitted). He also pointed out that the penalty had a "remedial
character," in part owing to the salutary purposes served by it, in that it protected the
revenue and reimbursed the government for investigating tax fraud and the loss caused
thereby. Such remedial objectives of the tax penalty precluded its being so punitive as to
bring the double jeopardy clause properly into play.
In United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1942), the Court faced a related
question. Defendants therein had been criminally convicted for defrauding the government.
Thereafter, pursuant to federal statute, they were sued by a private party for sums to be
"forfeited" to the government as well as for double damages to be split by the government
and the private party. Defendants contended that the civil action was barred by the pro-
hibition against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court flatly disagreed, noting, among other
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remedies secured by civil proceedings."1 Other decisions, seemingly in-
consistent with Taber, sanction statutory awards of civil damages which
exceed actual compensation even though the defendant is also subject to
criminal prosecution." The legislature can, for example, create a crimi-
nal offense, annex a fine to it and further provide "that the wrong-doer
shall be liable to the injured party in a fixed or limited sense" without
violating double jeopardy. 2 Consistent with Taber, however, it has been
held that a statute which allows unlimited exemplary damages, rather
than specifying a fixed or limited sum for an act punishable by the crimi-
nal law, does violate the principle that no one shall be placed in jeopardy
twice for the same offense. 3
Recent Indiana decisions suggest that the Taber rule be reconsidered."
In one such decision, 5 the plaintiff sued for compensatory damages sus-
tained in an automobile collision. Punitive damages were also requested
because the defendant had been intoxicated and had left the scene of
the accident. Nevertheless, after the defendant had been convicted of
reckless driving on the same facts, he obtained summary judgment on
the prayer for punitive damages by arguing that they were improper
under Taber. Since the defendant was punished by the criminal law and
would be subject to "double punishment" if punitive damages were
awarded, the court affirmed on appeal. Although untroubled by the ap-
plication of the Taber rule when an initial jeopardy had already been
suffered, the court did not address the issue of the rule's application
where "there is merely the possibility of criminal prosecution.""' The
court expressed concern that the reasons behind the rule had not been
scrutinized in over eighty years; it is this concern which provides the
focus of this comment.
things, that as to the double damages: "This remedy does not lose the quality of a civil ac-
tion because more than the precise amount of so-called actual damage is recovered." Id at
550. The Court also noted that, as to the forfeiture: "No one doubts that Congress could
have accomplished the same result by authorizing 'double' or 'quadruple' or 'punitive'
damages .... Id. at 551. The Court has similarly refused to apply principles of double
jeopardy to proceedings or statutes which can be defended *as remedial and civil rather
than exclusively criminal and punitive. See, e.g., One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One
Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148
(1955); United States ex rel. Ostrager v. New Orleans Chapter, Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors, 317 U.S. 562 (1943); Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577
(1931). The reasoning of such cases suggests that the Taber rule could be abolished, since
even punitive damages serve remedial objectives and are recovered in civil proceedings.
10 5 Ind. at 325.
1, See note 9 supra.
" State ex rel. Scobey v. Stevens, 103 Ind. 55, 65, 2 N.E. 214, 220 (1885).
" See Koerner v. Oberly, 56 Ind. 284 (1877). But see State ex rel. Scobey v. Stevens, 103
Ind. 55, 2 N.E. 214 (1885).
" See note 4 & accompanying text supra.
" Glissman v. Rutt, - Ind. App. - , 372 N.E.2d 1188 (1978).
SId. at - n.2, 372 N.E.2d at 1189 n.2.
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Both the Indiana and United States constitutions prohibit putting a
man in jeopardy twice for the same offense.17 But protection against
double jeopardy is ancient; it predates the constitutional protections
and was firmly established in the common law. Writing in the seven-
teenth century, Lord Coke described the protection of the principle
against double jeopardy as stemming from three common law pleas:
autrefois acquit, autrefois convict and former pardon." The construction
of the double jeopardy clause in the United States Constitution has
paralleled these common law pleas. Double jeopardy has been held to
protect against reprosecution after acquittal, against reprosecution
after conviction and, generally, against the imposition of multiple
punishment for the same offense.19 As early as the fifteenth century,
English courts occasionally used the very term "jeopardy" to describe
the principle against multiple trials or reprosecuting a criminal defen-
dant for the same crime."0 Justice Black once argued with conviction in a
dissenting opinion: "Even in the Dark Ages, when so many other prin-
ciples of justice were lost, the idea that one trial and one punishment
were enough remained alive ... ."21 Double jeopardy is, in other words, a
protection with a lengthy and accepted, albeit evolving, heritage.
Though the constitutional principle of double jeopardy, as applied to
various fact situations, often varies,' the reasons for the protection, as
"7 See note 1 & accompanying text supra. See generally Comley, Former Jeopardy, 35
YALE L.J. 674 (1926); Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE
L.J. 513 (1949); Parker, Some Aspects of Double Jeopardy, 25 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 188 (1951);
Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283 (1963); Westen & Drubel,
Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SuP. CT. REV. 81; Note, Double Jeopardy
and Government Appeals in Criminal Cases, 12 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 295 (1976).
" 3 E. COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 212-13 (1680).
See generally M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 113-15 (1969); 2 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 240 (1847); 2 W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
368-99 (1721); Bigelow, Former Conviction and Former Acquittal, 11 RUT. L. REV. 487 (1957);
Moodie, Autrefois Acquit and Autrefois Convict in New Zealand Criminal Law - Part
One,[1974] N.Z. L.J. 169; Moodie, Autrefois Acquit and Autrefois Convict in New Zealand
Criminal Law-Part Two, [1974] N.Z. L.J. 194; Moodie, Autrefois Acquit and Convict in
Canada and New Zealand, 17 CRIM. L.Q. 72 (1974).
" See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975); North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Elmore v. State, 269 Ind. 532, 534, 382 N.E.2d 893, 894 (1978); State
v. Dolack, 216 Kan. 622, 631, 533 P.2d 1282, 1290 (1975); State v. Cameron, 283 N.C. 191, 198,
195 S.E.2d 481, 485-86 (1973).
" J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 1-16 (1969); Kirk, "Jeopardy" During the Period of the
Year Books, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 602, 604-05 (1934). See also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *335 ("that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more
than once for the same offence" declared fundamental maxim of the common law).
' Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 152 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
n See Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 263 (1965) (stating that the prohibition
on double jeopardy "is not one rule but several, each applying to a different situation; and
1980]
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well as its general meaning as a matter of policy, are not open to serious
question:
In its traditional application, double jeopardy is a rule of finality: a
single fair trial on a criminal charge bars reprosecution. Double
jeopardy shares the purposes of civil law rules of finality; it protects
the defendant from continuing distress, enables him to consider the
matter closed and to plan ahead accordingly, and saves both the pub-
lic and defendant the cost of redundant litigation.... It was called
forth more by oppression than by crowded calendars. It equalizes, in
some measure, the adversary capabilities of grossly unequal litigants.
It reflects not only our demand for speedy justice, but all our civilized
caution about criminal law-our respect for a jury verdict and the
presumption of innocence, our aversion to needless punishment, and
our distinction between prosecution and persecution. '
Once a defendant is convicted and punished, fairness and finality pro-
hibit an additional trial or increased punishment. The double jeopardy
clause thus serves a purpose of prohibiting multiple trials or successive
prosecutions. 4 A prosecutor is thereby disabled from subjecting a
defendant to harrassment, unnecessary expense or the ordeal of living
in a constant state of anxiety.
The protection of double jeopardy traditionally is relevant only to the
imposition of punitive sanctions, making its application virtually unique
to criminal proceedings. '5 It has been said, in fact, that "in the civil en-
each rule is marooned in a sea of exceptions"). Note, Double Jeopardy, 24 MINN. L. REv.
522, 522-23 (1940), confirms this viewpoint:
Hailed as "the beacon-light of modern civilization," condemned as a "quaint
relic of medieval jargon," the riddle of double jeopardy stands out today as
one of the most commonly recognized yet most commonly misunderstood max-
ims in the law, the passage of time having served in the main to burden it with
confusion upon confusion. In the words of one writer, "but little help is given
either by text-writers, or by the adjudications of the courts. The cases are
mainly confined to the facts at issue, and the text-books to an enumeration of
these facts and cases."
Even the United States Supreme Court recognized in a recent opinion that there is a "state
of conceptual confusion existing in this area of the law." Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1,
9 (1978).
" Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 277 (1965); accord, Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1977); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529-30 (1975); United States v.
Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969); Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
" United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331
(1970); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1970); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 18
(1919); see United States v. Pierce, 593 F.2d 415, 419 (1st Cir. 1979).
" Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1970):
Jeopardy denotes risk. In the constitutional sense, jeopardy describes the
risk that is traditionally associated with a criminal prosecution .... Although
the constitutional language, "jeopardy of life or limb," suggests proceedings in
which only the most serious penalties can be imposed, the Clause has long
been construed to mean something far broader than its literal language ....
At the same time, however, we have held that the risk to which the Clause
[Vol. 56:71
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forcement of a remedial sanction there can be no double jeopardy." 6 In
criminal proceedings, a plea of double jeopardy commonly triggers an
analysis of whether or nbt an initial punitive sanction or risk has been
suffered.' Statutes which prescribe cumulative punitive sanctions, com-
monplace in the history of both state and federal legislation, often allow
several means of redressing a single offense without bringing into play
the double jeopardy clause. 8 Antitrust laws, for example, allow civil
suits for the collection of treble damages in addition to prescribed crimi-
nal penalties. 29 The general test governing whether multiple punitive
refers is not present in proceedings that are not "essentially criminal."
Id. at 528 (citations & footnotes omitted); see Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398-99,
404 (1938); Hunter v. State, 172 Ind. App. 397, 407-08, 360 N.E.2d 588, 596 (1977).
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 404 (1938).
This analysis, known as "attachment," proceeds on the assumption that double jeopardy
is impossible unless an initial jeopardy has been incurred. Despite the simplicity of the
governing principle, courts must struggle with individual cases, especially since judges
often place different emphasis upon the fundamental purposes of the clause. See THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. DOc. No.
92-82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. S146-47 (Supp. 1978):
[Tihe Supreme Court has decided an uncommonly large number of double
jeopardy cases and engaged in a major re-evaluation of doctrine and principle.
The result has not been, however, the development of clear and consistent
guidelines but rather because of the differing emphases of the Justices upon
the purposes of the clause the results have more often reflected highly
technical distinctions and individualistic fact patterns. Three Justices believe
that the purpose of the clause is only to protect final judgments relating to
culpability, either of acquittal or conviction, and that English common law
rules designed to protect the defendant's right to go to the first jury picked
had become confused with the double jeopardy clause; in their view, the clause
properly has no role to play before final judgment. Three Justices believe that
the clause not only protects the integrity of final judgments but more impor-
tant it protects the accused against the strain and burden of multiple trials,
which also enhance the ability of government to convict. The remaining three
Justices fall somewhere between the other two groups and although they en-
dorse both roles for the clause, it appears that they engage in some form of
balancing of defendants' rights with society's rights to determine when
reprosecution should be permitted when a trial ends prior to a final judgment
not hinged on the defendant's culpability. Thus, the basic area in which the
doctrinal disagreements result in uncertain case law is the trial from the at-
tachment of jeopardy to the judgment of not guilty.
Certain fixed rules exist nevertheless; jeopardy in a bench trial, for example, attaches when
the court begins to hear evidence, Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 27 n.3 (1977), whereas
jeopardy in a jury trial attaches when the jury is sworn, Gullett v. State, 233 Ind. 6, 9, 116
N.E.2d 234, 235 (1954); Kelley v. State, 156 Ind. App. 134, 138, 295 N.E.2d 372, 375 (1973);
Crim v. State, 156 Ind. App. 66, 75, 294 N.E.2d 822, 828 (1973). The federal rule making
jeopardy attach when the jury is sworn binds the states. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978).
" Herald Co. v. Harper, 410 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1969); State ex rel. Scobey v. Stevens, 103
Ind. 55, 2 N.E. 214 (1885).
29 See, e.g., Sherman Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1977) (as amended) (combination in restraint
of trade is a felony); Clayton Act, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1977) (injured person may sue for tre-
ble damages); IND. CODE § 24-1-2-2 (Supp. 1980) (to monopolise is Class C misdemeanor); Id. §
24-1-2-7 (1976) (injured party may bring treble damage action); cf. IND. CODE § 34-1-60-9 (1980
Supp.) (attorney guilty of deceit with intent to deceive court guilty of Class B misdemeanor
and subject to treble damage action).
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sanctions may be imposed for separate criminal offenses is whether
each crime requires proof of a single fact which the other does not."
Thus, crimes like conspiracy to commit an offense and the offense itself
can be separately punished without violating double jeopardy even
though both are based on the same course of conduct."
Exemplary damages have both a punitive and remedial purpose such
that the interests of society and an aggrieved individual are blended
together." It is often said that some public interest should be served by
their award." Such damages do not rest upon any ground of abstract
justice; rather, they are founded upon an established policy which pro-
motes the public safety and deters malicious or outrageous conduct, as
well as punishes through the medium of a civil proceeding. 4 The amount
of punitive damages necessary to achieve these ends rests within the
sound discretion of the jury in an action at law." In Indiana, exemplary
damages may also be recovered in a court of equity," although allowing
a punitive sanction to be imposed by a court of mercy appears incon-
gruous.
'4 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932):
Each of the offenses created requires proof of a different element. The ap-
plicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation
of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires
proof of a fact which the other does not .... A single act may be an offense
against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does
not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other."
Id. at 304 (citations omitted); see Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975);
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643-44 (1946); Morris v. State, - Ind. -.
398 N.E.2d 1284, 1286 (1980); Elmore v. State, 269 Ind. 532, 533-39, 382 N.E.2d 893, 894-97
(1978).
31 E.g., United States v. Austin, 529 F.2d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Cort-
wright, 528 F.2d 168, 176 (7th Cir. 1975); Elmore v. State, 269 Ind. 532, 541, 382 N.E.2d 893,
898 (1978); Collier v. State, __ Ind. App. - -, 362 N.E.2d 871, 874 (1977).
' See Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322, 324 (1854).
' See Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 266 Ind. 310, 314, 362 N.E.2d 845, 848 (1977);
Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 608, 349 N.E.2d 173, 180 (1976); Sandock
v. F. D. Borkholder Co., - Ind. App. -, -, 396 N.E.2d 955, 958 (1979); Monte Carlo,
Inc. v. Wilcox, - Ind. App. -, ., 390 N.E.2d 673, 675 (1979).
' Murphy Auto Sales, Inc. v. Coomer 123 Ind. App. 709, 717-18, 112 N.E.2d 589, 592-93
(1953); see Vaughn v. Peabody Coal Co., __ Ind. App. -, - 375 N.E.2d 1159, 1163
(1978); Indianapolis Bleaching Co. v. McMillan, 64 Ind. App. 268, 272, 113 N.E. 1019, 1020
(1916).
35 Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576, 587 (7th Cir. 1952); Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Bat-
chelor, 266 Ind. 310, 317, 362 N.E.2d 845, 849 (1977); see Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Cen-
tral Beverage Co., 172 Ind. App. 81, 105, 359 N.E.2d 566, 581 (1977); cf. Whities v. Yamaha
Int'l Corp., 531 F.2d 968, 973 (10th Cir. 1976) (will not disturb trial court's discretion).
' Hedworth v. Chapman, 135 Ind. App. 129, 133-34, 192 N.E.2d 649, 651 (1963).
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CRITICISM OF THE RULE
Because different burdens of proof are applicable in civil and criminal
proceedings, the Taber rule results in unfairness to tort claimants. A
decision to initiate a criminal proceeding is invariably affected by the
burden placed upon a prosecutor of proving each element of a crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 A civil claimant, however, must meet a
lesser burden of proof-a preponderance of the evidence-even when
punitive damages are sought.' If the prosecutor in fact does not pursue
potential charges, leaving only the possibility of criminal punishment
" This standard is mandated by statute in Indiana. See IND. CODE § 35-41-4-1(a) (Supp.
1980). For discussions concerning the sufficiency of evidence, see Sizemore v. State,
Ind. -, _ 395 N.E.2d 783, 785, (1979); Burton v. State, 260 Ind. 94, 111-13, 292 N.E.2d
790, 800-02 (1973); Taylor v. State, 257 Ind. 664, 667, 278 N.E.2d 273, 275 (1972); Dillon v.
State, 257 Ind. 412, 416, 275 N.E.2d 312, 314 (1971).
Kempf v. Himsel, 121 Ind. App. 488, 516, 98 N.E.2d 200, 212 (1951):
This appeal involves a civil case ... where the burden was merely to prove
the material allegations of the complaint by a "fair preponderance of the
evidence," and where there was no presumption of freedom from fault or
freedom from liability ....
The distinction between "beyond reasonable doubt" in a criminal case and a
"fair preponderance of the evidence" in a civil case has always been recogniz-
ed in Indiana jurisprudence. The two are wholly different, clearly recognize
distinguishable degrees of burdens of proof and, of course, the duty of
establishing a fact "beyond reasonable doubt" imposes a duty far greater than
to establish the same fact by a "fair preponderance."
Accord, Hale v. State, 248 Ind. 630, 632, 230 N.E.2d 432, 433 (1967).
In Indiana, a tort which is also a crime need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
before damages therefor may be recovered. Barger v. Barger, 221 Ind. 530, 536, 48 N.E.2d
813, 815 (1943); Shelby Mfg. Co. v. Harris, 112 Ind. App. 627, 633, 44 N.E.2d 315, 318 (1942);
Kaufman v. American Sur. Co., 89 Ind. App. 393, 397, 166 N.E. 615, 616-17 (1929). The In-
diana Supreme Court explained the justification for this rule in Continental Ins. Co. v.
Jachnichen, 110 Ind. 59, 60-61, 10 N.E. 636, 637 (1887):
The rule which demands greater certainty and weight of proof in criminal than
is required in civil cases, has its foundation in the tender regard in which the
law holds the life and liberty of the subject.
It had its origin, and was moulded into form and consistency, when the
penal code of England visited upon offences of a comparatively trivial
character the most harsh and cruel punishments. To mitigate the rigor of a
code sometimes administered with severity, humane judges engrafted upon
the common law the rule that no one should be convicted of a crime which af-
fected life or liberty, until his guilt was established with such a degree of cer-
tainty as to exclude every reasonable doubt. Having grown up out of the
humanity of the law, the rule is very properly retained in criminal cases, even
after the reasons for it have in good measure ceased to exist. Indeed, there is
little of any rule whose origin, however remote, is found in the source whence
this rule came, which should either be dissipated or' obscured in the ad-
ministration of the law. The consequences of a mistake, when life and liberty
are involved, are so overwhelming and irreparable that the integrity of the
rule which requires a greater degree of certainty and caution in such a case,
before coming to a conclusion, than in a case which affects property merely,
should be steadily maintained and intelligently applied.
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present, the tort claimant still cannot seek punitive damages although
his civil burden of proof could well be met and the facts might clearly
merit their award. 9 In such situations, the Taber rule prevents a defen-
dant from suffering an initial jeopardy, let alone double jeopardy, mak-
ing the effect of the rule an exoneration from punishment rather than
the prevention of unnecessary punishment.
The comparatively short statutes of limitation which govern tort ac-
tions create additional concern. In Indiana, the general statute of limita-
tion for torts is two years.40 Statutes of limitation for most crimes which
are also torts, however, are commonly much longer."' When the tort
statute is shorter, a civil claimant must promptly litigate for recover-
able compensatory damages to avoid expiration of the cause of action.
Anomalous applications of the Taber rule result when the state prose-
cutes for the crime which is also a tort but fails to secure conviction
within two years."2 The tort claimant can then seek both punitive and
compensatory damages since Taber does not come into play if no possi-
bility of criminal prosecution exists or if the possibility of criminal
prosecution has been exhausted. In other words, the civil claimant's
ability to seek punitive damages may depend merely upon whether a
prosecutor diligently pursues a criminal case and not upon the merit of
any claim for punitive damages.
Prohibiting a prayer for punitive damages when there is a mere possi-
bility of criminal punishment effectively disregards the realities of a
criminal justice system fraught with discretion."3 The prosecutor has
Moore v. Waitt, 157 Ind. App. 1, 7-8, 298 N.E.2d 456, 460 (1973).
,0 IND. CODE § 34-1-2-2(1) (1976) (two year statute of limitation for most torts).
41 In Indiana, the period of limitation for felonies is five years and the period of limita-
tion for misdemeanors is two years. I& § 35-41-4-2 (Supp. 1980).See, e.g., Cohen v. Peoples, 140 Ind. App. 353, 220 N.E.2d 665 (1966).
, Criminal law in fact has been characterized as "an island of technicality in a sea of
discretion." J. HALL & S. GLUECK. CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 3 (1951). Discretion
is exercised by police, witnesses, prosecutors, judges, victims and juries.
The police exercise discretion whether to arrest or not, whether to in-
vestigate or not. The prosecutor has, too, the discretion whether to initiate a
prosecution or not, or whether to investigate or not. The grand jury, if there is
one, has virtual discretion to indict or not, the contrary applicable statutes
notwithstanding. The prosecutor, again, has a discretion whether to prosecute
an indictment, or to nolle pros., or to accept a lesser plea. The court has a
discretion in determining which counts to submit to a jury, the kind of charge
to give to the jury, the lesser plea it may accept, or the sentence that will be
imposed. The petty jury, of course, has, in the criminal case, a practically un-
controlled discretion to acquit. There is obvious discretion in the probation
agency, if an offender is turned over to it. There is an ever larger discretion
reposed in correctional agencies. It is evident in classification, reception
centers, modes of treatment, and the various rewards, including time credit
for good behavior. Parole exercises the broadest discretion in releasing, condi-
tioning release, supervising, and returning offenders for violation. There is




great discretion with regard to whether or not to press charges. In
some cases, the particular fact situation may make it inappropriate to
press charges, while in others practical considerations or law enforce-
ment needs may make it inadvisable to press charges." The Taber rule
Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 427, 428 (1960). See
generally Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1971); Cole, The Decision to Prosecute, 4 LAW & Soc. REv. 331 (1970);
Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions
in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960); Pound, Discretion, Dispensation
and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 925 (1960);
Tieger, Police Discretion and Discriminatory Enforcement, [1971] DUKE L.J. 717.
Professor Morris made important observations about the role which punitive damages
can play in achieving an equitable balance of interest when an act is both criminal and tor-
tious:
[I]t is a notoriously good guess that current administration of the criminal law is
not particularly efficient. Many criminals are not apprehended. Penalties fixed-
at least as to maximum and minimum-in advance by a legislature which does not
have the particular culprit in mind may not make for effective punishment in par-
ticular cases. So it is possible that the allowance of punitive damages for torts
which are also crimes may remedy some maladjustment not adequately treated
by the criminal law. And most courts allow punitive damages, even though the
defendant has been, or can be, prosecuted criminally.
Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1173, 1196 (1931) (footnote omit-
ted). While an argument can be advanced that allowing punitive damages-scarcely provides
a civil claimant with a right capable of successful exercise-especially, for example, against
the unapprehended criminal-such a right is nonetheless limited only by the shortcomings
of private initiative rather than by the shortcomings of the criminal justice system. That a
defendant is subject only to the possibility of criminal prosecution sheds no light on
whether the public interest in seeking punishment will be vindicated by prosecution, let
alone on why private initiative should be thwarted.
In Indiana, prosecuting attorneys represent the state in all criminal cases, State ex rel.
Powers v. Vigo Circuit Court, 236 Ind. 408, 412, 140 N.E.2d 497, 499 (1957), and their discre-
tion to enforce substantive criminal law is recognized, see, e.g., Dembowski v. State, 251
Ind. 250, 253, 240 N.E.2d 815, 817 (1968); Tinder v. Music Operating Inc., 237 Ind. 33, 46, 142
N.E.2d 610, 617 (1957); Brune v. Marshall, 169 Ind. App. 637, 639-40, 350 N.E.2d 661, 662
(1976). Out of respect for the separation of powers, a prosecutor's refusal to pursue a case is
not subject to judicial control at the request of private parties. Inmates of Attica Correc-
tional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379-80 (2d Cir. 1973); State ex rel. Spencer v.
Criminal Court, 214 Ind. 551, 556-57, 15 N.E.2d 1020, 1022-23 (1938). Generally, even
deliberate selectivity in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion will raise no problem of
equal protection. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
" THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS (1967), said of such realities:
[Clommunity attitudes justifiably demand that the armed robber, the corrupt
public official, and the hardened, persistent offender be subjected to the full
weight of condemnation. But in many cases effective law enforcement does not re-
quire punishment or attachment of criminal status, and community attitudes do
not demand it....
The legitimacy and necessity of the prosecutor's discretion in pressing charges
have long been recognized. There are many cases in which it would be inap-
propriate to press charges. In some instances, a street fight for example, the
police may make lawful arrests that are not intended to be carried forward to pro-
secution .... Often it becomes apparent after arrest that there is insufficient
evidence to support a conviction or that a necessary witness will not cooperate or
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fails to face these realities because it permits no consideration to be
given to the desirability of exemplary damages if no criminal prosecu-
tion is instituted or if a criminal conviction is, for any of the foregoing
reasons, unlikely or unnecessary.
The Taber rule, moreover, disallows punitive damages in cases where
the policies underlying them would be justly advanced by their award.
Before a court can allow exemplary damages, some malice, fraud, op-
pression, gross negligence or willful misconduct must be established.45
An award of punitive damages for ordinary negligence is improper.'6
Those claimants who could best make the showing necessary to recover
punitive damages are those who have been intentionally or willfully in-
jured. Intentional and willful wrongdoers are also those on whom impos-
ing punitive damages would advance the policies of deterrence and the
promotion of public safety which underlie them. Nevertheless, claimants
who have been intentionally injured are virtually always prevented
from seeking punitive damages since the defendant is usually subject to
criminal prosecution for his intentional tort. The Taber rule has the
is unavailable; an arrest may be made when there is probable cause to believe
that the person apprehended committed an offense, while conviction after formal
charge requires proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, subsequent in-
vestigation sometimes discloses the innocence of the accused.
When there is sufficient evidence of guilt, tactical considerations and law en-
forcement needs may make it inadvisable to press charges. Prosecutors may, for
example, drop charges in exchange for a potential defendant's cooperation in giv-
ing information or testimony against a more serious offender. They may need to
conserve their resources for more serious cases.
Id. at 5 (footnotes omitted).
E.g., Millison v. Hoch, 17 Ind. 227, 228 (1861); Vaughn v. Peabody Coal Co., - Ind.
App .... 375 N.E.2d 1159, 1163 (1978); Brademas v. Real Estate Dev. Co., - Ind.
App .... 370 N.E.2d 997, 999 (1977); accord, Chavez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 525
F.2d 827, 829-30 (10th Cir. 1975) (Oklahoma law); Munson v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 484 F.2d 620, 622-23 (7th Cir. 1973) (Illinois law). In addition, acts or omissions in
"heedless disregard of the consequences" may justify an award of punitive damages.
Citizens' Street R.R. v. Willoeby, 134 Ind. 563, 569, 33 N.E. 627, 629 (1893); Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Executive Estates, Inc., - Ind. App. -, -, 369 N.E.2d 1117, 1131 (1977). Com-
pare Nicholson v. Schramm, 164 Ind. App. 598, 330 N.E.2d 785 (1975) (pointing out three ap-
parent exceptions to Taber rule) with McCarty v. Sparks, - Ind. App. -, -, 388
N.E.2d 296 (1979) (exception for heedless disregard of consequences rejected). In civil ac-
tions seeking damages for breach of contract, punitive damages are properly awarded if a
showing of malice, fraud, oppression, gross negligence or willfulness amounting to an in-
dependent tort is made. Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 266 Ind. 310, 314, 362 N.E.2d
845, 847-48 (1977); United Farm Bureau Family Life Ins. Co. v. Fultz, - Ind. App. _,
- n.2, 375 N.E.2d 601, 606-07 n.2 (1978); accord, Steinberg v. Ogden Foods, Inc., 501 F.2d
1339, 1341 (6th Cir. 1974) (applying Ohio law); Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962, 971 (5th
Cir. 1970) (applying Florida law).
" Prudential Ins. Co. v. Executive Estates, Inc., - Ind. App .... 369 N.E.2d
1117, 1131 (1977); Sinclair Ref. Co. v. McCullom, 107 Ind. App. 356, 365, 24 N.E.2d 784, 788
(1940). Nor can criminal responsibility be premised on ordinary negligence. Luther v. State,
177 Ind. 619, 626, 98 N.E. 640, 642 (1912); accord, Mills v. State, 13 Md. App. 196, 200, 282
A.2d 147, 149 (1971); Delay v. Brainard, 182 Neb. 509, 514-15, 156 N.W.2d 14, 19 (1968;
Lewis v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 684, 687, 179 S.E.2d 506, 509 (1971).
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lamentable effect in such instances of not only defeating entirely certain
salutary and remedial policies which underlie exemplary damages, but
also disregarding socially desirable results which would be achieved by
allowing them.
Preventing a defendant from enduring multiple trials, a fundamental
purpose of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, cannot
be achieved by applying principles of double jeopardy to civil plaintiffs
seeking punitive damages. A defendant who commits a tort which is il-
legal will always be potentially subject to "multiple trials"-one civil
and one criminal. Although the Taber rule prevents punitive damages
when the defendant is subject to criminal prosecution for a tort, it does
not prevent a tort claimant from seeking compensatory damages. 7 The
claimant retains an interest in obtaining reasonable compensation for
his injury and, therefore, redress will always be litigated separately
from the state's pursuit of a criminal conviction. For this reason, the
Taber rule cannot effectively implement the double jeopardy purpose of
diminishing the uncertainty which a defendant faces from the possibility
of enduring multiple trials as a result of a single act or course of con-
duct. At best, the rule merely reduces the amount of exposure which a
defendant faces in a civil trial. But a reduction of exposure in civil cases
has never been an evil against which double jeopardy was meant to pro-
tect.48
The rule articulated in Taber is not widely followed in other jurisdic-
tions. In fact, one decision in this state recognized: "Indiana is in the
distinct minority of states which disallows exemplary damages in a civil
action if the party against whom they are levied is subject to criminal
prosecution arising out of the same act."49 Many jurisdictions distin-
guish between the interests affected by civil and criminal proceedings;
whereas criminal proceedings vindicate the interests of the state and
1' Note, Multiple Punishment Under the Double Jeopardy Rule, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 291,
292 (1931); see Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178, 188-89 (1897); Jones v. District of Col-
umbia, 212 F. Supp. 438, 449 (D.D.C. 1962); Wilson v. Gehring, 152 Mont. 221, 227-28, 448
P.2d 678, 682 (1968); Royer Motor Vehicle Operator License Case, 213 Pa. Super. 17, 21, 245
A.2d 716, 718 (1968). This proposition also follows from the very meaning of protection
against double jeopardy; since compensatory damages have no punitive objective and are
wholly remedial, they cannot raise concern about the infliction of unwarranted punishment
which principles of double jeopardy prevent. See Ex parte Lange 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173
(1873). A new trial on the issue of compensatory damages alone has been held proper for a
tort which is also a crime. See McCarty v. Sparks, - Ind. App. -, 388 N.E.2d 296
(1979). Alternatives to civil recovery of compensatory damages caused by violent crime
have also been considered. Svetanoff, Compensation for Victims of Violent Crimes, RES
GESTAE, Jan. 1973, at 6.
" See notes 1, 9 supra.
" Cohen v. Peoples, 140 Ind. App. 353, 356, 220 N.E.2d 665, 668 (1966). But see Angelloz
v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 196 La. 604, 199 So. 656 (1941); Austin v. Wilson, 58 Mass. (4
Cush.) 273 (1850); Boyer v. Barr, 8 Neb. 68 (1878); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1873).
1980]
INDIANA ILAW JOURNAL
public, civil lawsuits seeking punitive damages are held to vindicate the
interests of an individual who has been the victim of a malicious
wrong." Following the rationale of the Taber rule, a criminal defendant
should be able to plead that his criminal prosecution is barred if he is
being sued in tort for punitive damages. Yet, the Taber rule does not
prevent the state from seeking criminal punishment merely because a
criminal defendant is sued for punitive damages in tort." One explana-
tion for the failure of Taber to bar state prosecution is that, while civil
and criminal sanctions may both be punitive, they vindicate distinct in-
terests. Ironically, Indiana decisions all appear to assume this distinc-
tion, since the Taber rule does not work in reverse.
The Taber rule sanctions unsettling differences of treatment among
tort claimants who have been willfully injured, since punitive damages
may be sought for intentional torts not within the jurisdiction of crimi-
nal statutes." The tort of defamation, which invades the security of
one's reputation is, for example, not now criminally punishable in Indi-
ana,3 and someone who is maliciously defamed may therefore seek puni-
tive damages. But other victims of intentional torts whose injury consti-
tutes a crime such as assault and battery are not able to seek punitive
damages. The operation of the Taber rule in such cases offends funda-
" See, e.g., Elliott v. Van Buren, 33 Mich. 49, 55-56 (1875); Morris v. McNab, 25 N.J. 271,
281, 135 A.2d 657, 662-63 (1957); Soucy v. Greyhound Corp., 27 A.D.2d 112, 113, 276
N.Y.S.2d 173, 175 (1967); Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 287-88 "(1878). Indiana courts
recognize this distinction for some purposes. See, e.g., State ex rel. Johnson v. White Cir-
cuit Court, 225 Ind. 602, 606-07, 77 N.E.2d 298, 300-01 (1948) (definition of tort and crime);
Reed v. Carrigan, 190 Ind. 29, 33, 129 N.E. 8, 9 (1920) (meaning of criminal offense).
,Indiana Cent. R.R. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681 (1856).
' Lytton v. Baird, 95 Ind. 349 (1883); Meyer v. Bohlfing, 44 Ind. 238 (1873); Weenig v.
Wood, 169 Ind. App. 413, 349 N.E.2d 235 (1976).
53 Cf. IND. CODE § 35-41-1-2, -43-1-2 (Supp. 1980) (definition of "property" conceivably
broad enough to include "reputation" under criminal mischief law); see Weenig v. Wood,
169 Ind. App. 413, 349 N.E.2d 235 (1976).
Formerly, the so-called dual sovereignty doctrine allowed a criminal offense under state
and federal laws to be prosecuted by both sovereigns, the United States and the State of In-
diana. Though each sovereign obtained a conviction, no violation of double jeopardy
resulted. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959); Heier v. State, 191 Ind. 410, 133 N.E. 200 (1921); Richardson v. State, 163 Ind. App.
222, 323 N.E.2d 291 (1975). But see Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the In-
truding Constitution, 28 U. CH. L. REV. 591 (1961) (although Constitution might allow dou-
ble prosecution, it still violates common law double jeopardy). Given the evident double
punishment which the doctrine allowed without offending double jeopardy, it is difficult to
see how fear of incurring double jeopardy would in principle prevent claimants from seek-
ing punitive damages for an illegal act. The dual sovereignty doctrine, however, may no
longer be the law in Indiana. See IND. CODE § 35-41-4-5 (Supp. 1980). As a matter of policy,
the federal authorities will refuse to prosecute a defendant if the state has already done so.
See Thompson v. United States, 444 U.S. 248 (1980); Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529
(1960). See also Note, The Problem of Double Jeopardy in Successive Federal-State Pro-
secutions: A Fifth Amendment Solution, 31 STAN. L. REV. 477 (1979).
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mental values which require equal treatment for claimants who are
similarly the victims of intentional wrongdoing.5M
Whenever changes are made in the scope of criminal statutes, the
Taber rule must be taken into account. Corporations, now subject to
criminal prosecution in Indiana," provide a case in point. While it is true
that a criminal conviction punishes, the application of Taber to corpora-
tions may often lead to underpunishment, particularly with large, well-
established operations." Since a corporation cannot be deprived of lib-
" See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; IND. CONST. art. I, § 23.
M IND. CODE § 35-41-2-3 (Supp. 1980). Corporations in Indiana have always been subject to
criminal prosecution if authorized by statute. State v. Terre Haute Brewing Co., 186 Ind.
248, 250, 115 N.E. 772, 772 (1917); State ex rel. Voyles v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co., 42
Ind. App. 282, 287, 85 N.E. 724, 725 (1907); see Paragon Paper Co. v. State, 19 Ind. App. 314,
49 N.E. 600 (1898).
N Concern with underpunishment of corporations is highlighted by the recent criminal
prosecution of Ford Motor Company. State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 11431 (Pulaski County
Cir. Ct. Mar. 13, 1980). Ford was tried by jury in Pulaski County on charges of reckless
homicide. Prosecution followed the deaths of three teenagers who were riding in a 1973
Pinto when it was rammed, causing it to explode after an allegedly defective gas tank rup-
tured. See generally IND. CODE § 35-41-2-3 (Supp. 1980) (corporations subject to criminal pro-
secution); id. § 35-42-1-5 (reckless homicide is Class C felony). The prosecution, although un-
successful, sought conviction on the ground that Ford was aware of the propensity of Pinto
gas tanks to rupture. At a maximum, Ford could have been fined only $10,000 upon convic-
tion-a sum insufficient to punish the company adequately. See id § 35-50-2-6 (Supp. 1980).
But see id. § 35-50-5-2 (1977) (alternative fine may be twice the pecuniary loss sustained by
victim). Abolition or modification of the Taber rule could allow courts to remedy such
maladjustments in the punishment provided by statute for crimes.
Additional concern is created by the Taber rule's application to corporations, since judi-
cial ability to achieve the objectives of strict liability in tort appears compromised, albeit
not thwarted entirely, when Taber is so applied. Strict liability makes sellers of products in
"defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property"
liable for physical damage caused by such products. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965) with IND. CODE § 33-1-1.5-3 (Supp. 1980). An improper or dangerous
design or a manufacturing flaw can make a product defective. See Gilbert v. Stone City
Constr. Co., 171 Ind. App. 418, 424-26, 357 N.E.2d 738, 744 (1976). The Indiana Supreme
Court later explicitly recognized strict liability as a part of the common law. See Ayr-Way
Stores, Inc. v. Chitwood, 261 Ind. 86, 300 N.E.2d 335 (1973). The Restatement's justification
for the doctrine was stated in Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106,
258 N.E.2d 681 (1970), to be "the ... special responsibility for the safety of the public under-
taken by one who enters into the business of supplying human beings with products which
may endanger the safety of their persons and properties, and the forced reliance upon that
undertaking on the part of those who purchase such goods." Id at 113, 258 N.E.2d 686
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment f (1965)). See also Chrysler
Corp. v. Alumbaugh, 168 Ind. App. 363, 374, 342 N.E.2d 908, 916 (1976). Punitive damages
may well be recoverable in products liability cases given proper proof, thereby deterring
defective products from finding their way into the Indiana marketplace. For similar posi-
tions in other states, see Casrell v. Altec Induss., Inc., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala. 1976); Toole v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); Moore v. Jewel Tea
Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 639 (1969). Although policy language and state statutes
influence results, courts often conclude that punitive damages cannot be or are not covered
by insurance, leaving the burden squarely on the corporation to develop safer products or
pay directly. Compare American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966) and
Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 213 N.W.2d 327 (1973) with Price v. Hartford Accident
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erty upon conviction, fines are the sole realistic way to inflict punish-
ment. But criminal fines are, by statute, limited in size and will often be
insufficient to affect adversely the financial interests of corporate stock-
holders and to achieve the goal of deterrence.57 Moreover, when a cor-
poration is prosecuted, the state's resources may be so taxed by pursu-
ing conviction that ability to prosecute other worthy cases is severely
compromised, contrary to the public's best interests. Alternatively, the
prospect of a demanding prosecution may deter the state from seeking
conviction in a meritorious case. Punitive damages do not share such
drawbacks, however, since a court or jury can tailor the size of their
award to the facts 8 and they are sought through private initiative.
The double jeopardy rationale of the Taber opinion does not seem to
recognize established differences between criminal punishment and
punitive damages. Taber held that allowing punitive damages when a
defendant is subject to criminal prosecution for the tort, although not
unconstitutional, sanctions double punishment, which does "not accord
with the spirit of our institutions."59 However, a glance at current crimi-
nal statutes refutes the soundness of such reasoning as a justification
for the rule. The "spirit of our institutions" currently allows both im-prisonment and a fine for the commission of a single crime." Criminal
convictions alone often adversely affect a defendant's pocketbook and
deprive him of liberty, although no violation of double jeopardy thereby
results. Civil lawsuits, however, affect only a defendant's pocketbook
& Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972) and Abbey Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc.
v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973). However, because corpora-
tions are now subject to criminal prosecution, Taber would prevent the recovery of puni-
tive damages even though criminal fines act as the sole punitive deterrent to the placement
of defective products into a market. See Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1258 (1976). Such a state of affairs appears inconsistent with
the broad remedial interpretation given in Indiana to the scope of strict liability in tort. See
Ayr-Way Stores, Inc. v. Chitwood, 261 Ind. 86, 300 N.E.2d 335 (1973) (strict liability applied
to bystander); Chrysler Corp. v. Alumbaugh, 168 Ind. App. 363, 342 N.E.2d 908 (1976) (by-
stander status does not preclude liability); Gilbert v. Stone City Constr. Co., 171 Ind. App.
418, 357 N.E.2d 738 (1976) (dictum) (strict liability applicable to lessor); Link v. Sun Oil Co.,
160 Ind. App. 310, 312 N.E.2d 126 (1974) (literal sale not required with strict liability).
'7 See IND. CODE §§ 35-50-2-4 to -7 (Supp. 1980); id. §§ 35-50-3-2 to -4; id. § 35-50-5-2.
' The financial worth of defendants sued for punitive damages may generally be con-
sidered by the jury and is discoverable. E.g., Thoresen v. Superior Court, 11 Ariz. App. 62,
461 P.2d 706 (1969); Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Central Beverage Co., 172 Ind. App. 81,
359 N.E.2d 566 (1977); State ex rel. Hall v. Cook, 400 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1966); Oskamp v.
Oskamp, 20 Ohio App. 349, 152 N.E. 208 (1925). Contra, Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322 (1854).
When punitive damages are awarded not in order to punish, but to compensate, courts deny
plaintiffs access to information on defendants' financial worth. See, e.g., Peisner v. Detroit
Free Press, Inc., 68 Mich. App. 360, 242 N.W.2d 775 (1976) (libel suit).
5 Ind. 322, 326 (1854).
Assault and battery a Class C felony if it results in serious injury, IND. CODE §
35-42-2-1(3) (Supp. 1980), furnishes an instructive example. Id. § 35-50-2-6 prescribes a typi-




even when punitive damages are sought. A principled basis for the
Taber rule becomes difficult to see following this reasoning, since crimi-
nal statutes alone appear to authorize the very kind of double punish-
ment which Taber forbids.
The Taber rule produces other troublesome results. For example,
minors and infants, normally presumed to lack the discretion necessary
to be held legally accountable, remain responsible for their torts"'
because "when civil injuries are committed by force, the intent of the
perpetration is not regarded."6 Only after the age of fourteen is a minor
presumed at common law to be capable of committing a crime."
A person who commits a Class C felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of
thirty (30) years, with not more than twenty (20) years added for aggravating
circumstances or not more than ten (10) years subtracted for mitigating cir-
cumstances; in addition, he may be fined not more than ten thousand dollars
($10,000).
Statutes providing for imprisonment as well as a fine are common, although punishment by
imprisonment and a fine may not be imposed under a statute which provides only for alter-
native penalties. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 175-76 (1873); Brown v. State, 254
Ind. 504, 507, 260 N.E.2d 876, 877-78 (1970). As is imprisonment, fines are established
methods of punishment, yet serious questions may be raised about their punitive efficiency
and effectiveness as deterrents. Flounting Fines, TnE, Mar. 24, 1980, at 65, highlighted the
drawbacks, at least at the federal level:
The Justice Department has a roster of some 18,000 federal cons who, all
told, owe about $80 million in fines and bail bond forfeitures. Some of the dead-
beats, among them many Prohibition moonshiners, are dead; others are in
prison, untraceable, or truly too poor to pay (tight-lipped Watergate Burglar
G. Gordon Liddy, for example, has paid only $5,051 of his $40,000 fine, and
Justice considers his pleas of poverty to be genuine). Yet the Department says
that there are some 3,500 debtors who can claim no excuses. Their fines total
about $20 million.
There is little reason to suppose similar problems do not exist at the state level. If so, the
case for allowing punitive damages to supplement the state's available criminal remedies is
strengthened, especially in those instances where debtors have no excuse.
" Daughterty v. Reveal, 54 Ind. App. 71, 78, 102 N.E. 381, 384 (1913); accord, State ex
rel. D. H., 139 N.J. Super. 330, 353 A.2d 570 (1976); Neumann v. Shlansky, 58 Misc. 2d 128,
294 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1968); Shiflet v. Segovia, 40 Ohio App. 2d 244, 318 N.E.2d 876 (1974).
Awards of punitive damages against minors have also been upheld. In Kirkpatrick v.
United States Nat'l Bank, 264 Or. 1, 502 P.2d 579 (1972), for example, the Oregon Supreme
Court stated concerning such an award against the guardian of a 15 year old:
We have previously held that the legal justification for punitive damages is
determent [sic] and that such damages will only be allowed when the violation
of societal interests is sufficiently great and the conduct involved is of a kind
that sanctions would tend to prevent....
We hold that the vandalizing of a house by a minor who is old enough to
know better, as in this case, falls within this rule.
Id. at 7, 502 P.2d at 582 (citations omitted).
62 Watson v. Wrightsman, 26 Ind. App. 437, 440, 59 N.E. 1064, 1065-66 (1901).
" Bottorff v. South Constr. Co., 184 Ind. 221, 227, 110 N.E. 977, 978 (1916). The rule that
juveniles are presumed incapable of committing crimes until the age of 14 is currently the
law in numerous jurisdictions. See, e.g., Senn v. State, 53 Ala. App. 297, 299 So. 2d 343
(1974); K. P. v. State, 327 So. 2d 820 (Fla. App. 1976); In re Davis, 17 Md. App. 98, 299 A.2d
856 (1973); State v. Rogers, 275 N.C. 411, 168 S.E.2d 345 1969). See generally Kean, The
History of the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 LAW Q. REv. 364 (1937).
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Moreover, minors processed through the juvenile justice system are not
considered to have committed crimes and are not designated as "crimi-
nals."6  For these reasons, someone hurt intentionally by a minor would
appear to be able to seek punitive damages which would be unrecover-
able from someone of majority.
Insanity or unsoundness of mind furnishes a second example. In Indi-
ana, persons of unsound mind are also responsible for their torts, with
the exception of slander,6 5 although unsoundness of mind prevents a
defendant from being criminally responsible." In a proper case, someone
hurt intentionally by a defendant of unsound mind could theoretically
seek punitive damages since no criminal liability could be imposed on
that defendant. These results, apparently fortuitous products of juxta-
posed rules of law, are unrelated to the laudable purposes which the
protection against double jeopardy is meant to advance.
Nor can one say that the fundamental objectives of the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy -protection against reprosecution
after acquittal, against reprosecution after conviction and against the
imposition of multiple punishment for the same offense67- are served by
the Taber rule. The first two objectives, limited to criminal proceedings,
have no direct application. Only the third objective, which is general
enough to extend to civil proceedings, conceivably is served by the
Taber rule. However, the interpretation given to the phrase "multiple
IND. CODE § 31-6-3-5 (Supp. 1980) provides:
(a) A child may not be charged with or convicted of a crime ... unless he
has been waived to a court having criminal jurisdiction.
(b) A child may not be considered a criminal by reason of an adjudication
in a juvenile court nor may such an adjudication be considered a conviction of
a crime. Such an adjudication does not impose any civil disability imposed by
conviction of a crime.
(c) A child's involvement with the juvenile justice system does not dis-
qualify him from any governmental application, examination, or appointment.
See State ex rel. Atkins v. Juvenile Court, 252 Ind. 237, 240, 247 N.E.2d 53, 54-55 (1969);
State ex rel. Johnson v. White Circuit Court, 225 Ind. 602, 608, 77 N.E.2d 298, 301 (1948).
Compare Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528-31 (1975) with Seay v. State, - Ind. App.
-, -, 363 N.E.2d 1063, 1065 (1977).
Woods v. Brown, 93 Ind. 164, 167 (1884).
IND. CODE § 35-41-3-6 (Supp. 1980) provides:
(a) A person is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct
if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity either
to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.
(b) 'Mental disease or defect' does not include an abnormality manifested
only by repeated unlawful or antisocial conduct.
See also id. §§ 35-5-2-1, -3(3) (1978); id. § 35-5-3.1-1 (1978). For cases concerning this issue, see
Gaskins v. United States, 410 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Wilson v. State, 263 Ind. 469, 333
N.E.2d 755 (1975); Fuller v. State, 261 Ind. 376, 304 N.E.2d 305 (1973); Evans v. State, 261
Ind. 148, 300 N.E.2d 882 (1973).
" See text accompanying note 19 supra.
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punishment" by Indiana courts illustrates the difficulty. A recent opin-
ion in which a defendant was convicted for both violating and conspiring
to violate a single statute furnishes a good example.68 The defendant ap-
pealed, arguing that his convictions constituted a violation of his right
to be protected against multiple punishments for the same offense. The
court, however, completely rejected his argument:
[Defendant] would have this court believe that since both of his con-
victions stem from the same prohibited conduct, he is being punished
twice for the same offense. This argument is without merit....
... [W]e hold here that one set of operative facts gave rise to two
distinct offenses and that [the defendant] was not subjected to multi-
ple punishments for the same offense. Therefore, the principle of dou-
ble jeopardy does not apply."
From this logic, the Taber rule cannot be said to prevent multiple
punishment, since double jeopardy's protection against multiple punish-
ment is not violated when more than one punitive sanction is imposed
for the same conduct. If two distinct criminal sanctions can be imposed
for the same conduct without violating double jeopardy, then a distinct
civil sanction and a criminal punishment should also be permissible.
The reasoning behind the Taber rule arguably ignores principles cen-
tral to the concept of double jeopardy, resulting in its having an un-
necessarily broad effect. For example, double jeopardy- analysis in a
criminal case commonly begins with consideration of when jeopardy at-
taches:' Applying the principle of double jeopardy to a civil action, how-
ever, causes the protection to attach immediately upon the defendant's
commission of a tortious act within the jurisdiction of a criminal
statute,7' although the prosecutor may never pursue criminal charges
and no actual punishment will ever be suffered. Second, even a criminal
defendant can be found under some circumstances to have forfeited or
lost the right to be protected against double jeopardy." In contrast, no
decision hints that the protection of Taber can be forfeited," although it
", Collier v. State, - Ind. App. -, 362 N.E.2d 871 (1977).
" Id. at - , 362 N.E.2d at 874.
"' See note 27 & accompanying text supra.
71 This proposition follows from the Taber rule's applicability when there exists a mere
possibility, rather than actual probability, of criminal prosecution. Moore v. Waitt, 157 Ind.
App. 1, 8, 298 N.E.2d 456, 460 (1973). One commentator has noted that, because Taber so ap-
plies, it places courts in the awkward position of construing criminal statutes in civil cases.
Aldridge, The Indiana Doctrine of Exemplary Damages and Double Jeopardy, 20 IND. L.J.
123, 127 (1945).
" United States v. Beckerman, 516 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Young, 503
F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1974); Cox v. Kansas, 456 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1972); Kelley v. State, 156
Ind. App. 134, 295 N.E.2d 372 (1973). See also Comment, Double Jeopardy and Reprosecu-
tion After Mistrials: Is the Manifest Necessity Test Manifestly Necessary?, 69 Nw. U.L.
REV. 887 (1975).
" But see Grad v. Cross, - Ind. App .... 395 N.E.2d 870, 872 (1979).
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is founded upon a right subject to forfeiture. The Taber rule thereby ap-
pears to protect a criminal defendant who is merely potentially subject
to suit for punitive damages to a greater degree than the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy in fact protects the actual criminal
defendant.
Applying principles of double jeopardy to civil proceedings also ap-
pears legally anomalous. Imprisonment for civil contempt can be im-
posed without observing safeguards characteristic of the criminal
process,74 and punitive damages themselves need not be proved by the
criminal law standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 Antitrust laws,
moreover, permit civil penalties such as treble damages and prescribe
criminal punishment without violating double jeopardy.7 One Indiana
decision has even countenanced the civil recovery of five times actual
damages in the face of criminal penalties simply because that sum was
fixed and limited."' But this justification does little to explain in princi-
ple why fixed damages as a penalty do not violate double jeopardy when
accompanied by criminal punishment whereas unlimited exemplary
damages do, especially when both limited and unlimited awards exceed
actual compensation. If, in fact, "each violation of the law should be
' See Duemling v. Fort Wayne Community Concerts, Inc., 243 Ind. 521, 188 N.E.2d 274
(1963). The power to punish contempts is inherent in Indiana courts. LaGrange v. State, 238
Ind. 689, 692, 153 N.E.2d 593, 595 (1958). Contempt proceedings are said to be neither civil
nor criminal. See State ex reL Trotcky v. Hutchinson, 224 Ind. 443,445-46, 68 N.E.2d 649, 650
(1946). Punishment per se is not the proper object of civil contempt proceedings, making
criminal safeguards unnecessary. In Denny v. State, 203 Ind. 682, 182 N.E. 313 (1932), for ex-
ample, the Indiana Supreme Court declared that "the so-called power to punish for civil con-
tempt is not a power to punish at all." I&. at 701, 182 N.E. at 319. Cf. IND. CODE §
33-2-1-4 (Criminal Contempts). Rather, civil contempt "is properly ... a power to ... coerce
by imprisonment or to impose money penalties for the benefit of the injured party."
203 Ind. at 700, 182 N.E. at 319; see State ex rel. McMinn v. Gentry, 229 Ind. 615, 100
N.E.2d 676 (1951). Whereas punitive measures are proper in cases of criminal contempt,
only coercive measures are said to be proper in cases of civil contempt. Ice v. State Bd. of
Dental Examiners, - Ind. App. -, - , 397 N.E.2d 1041, 1042 (1979).
There is reason to believe, nevertheless, that punitive consequences can and do follow
civil contempt. The terms "fine" and "penalty," as well as "punishment," are used by the
courts in civil contempt proceedings. See, e.g., Thistlethwaith v. State, 149 Ind. 319, 49 N.E.
156 (1908). Even the Indiana Supreme Court has recognized that "some of the decisions of
both this Court and the Appellate Court have apparently approved the infliction of a puni-
tive sentence in a proceeding which was called a civil contempt action." Denny v. State, 203
Ind. at 700, 182 N.E. at 319. Moreover, intangible elements of damage such as incon-
venience and frustration can be awarded in civil contempt proceedings. See Thomas v.
Woollen, 255 Ind. 612, 266 N.E.2d 20 (1971). Such a rule can allow a court to inflict punish-
ment in the name of awarding compensation, thereby making disapproval of punishing for
civil contempt potentially illusory. Finally, imprisonment, characteristic of the criminal pro-
cess, is an accepted sanction to impose upon proof of a civil contempt.
" See Note, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L.
REv. 408, 417-18 (1967); note 38 & accompanying text supra.
,' See text accompanying note 29 supra.
State ex rel. Scobey v. Stevens, 103 Ind. 55, 2 N.E. 214 (1885).
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followed by one appropriate punishment and no more,""8 the justifica-
tion cannot be accepted, especially when it could be used to validate a
limited or fixed award of ten, fifteen or even twenty times actual
damages. Nonetheless, if the award of fixed damages does not call into
operation the protection against double jeopardy, then neither should a
defendant's commission of an act which merits the award of punitive
damages and which is also a crime.
Practical legislative alternatives to the Taber rule do exist. For exam-
ple, the bar on asking for punitive damages could be transformed into
an evidentiary rule. Under such a rule, if a claimant brought a civil ac-
tion and requested punitive damages, the defendant could introduce into
evidence at trial any criminal conviction for the tort which constituted
an initial jeopardy. Counsel could then argue to the trier of fact the
merits of imposing exemplary damages and the amount necessary to
deter or promote the public safety, and punishment would be imposed
according to the discretion of the trier of fact. This approach, although
not entirely free from difficulty," would alleviate much concern with
underpunishment and inadequate punishment which the Taber rule now
raises. Alternatively, proof of an initial jeopardy-an actual conviction
-could be established at an evidentiary hearing before trial, and, pend-
ing an appropriate finding by the court, no punitive damages could then
be sought.
Courts, on the other hand, should consider abolishing the Taber rule
altogether, especially as it applies when there is merely the possibility
of criminal prosecution. The rule has numerous weaknesses and insures
in many cases that underpunishment or no punishment at all results.
Moreover, the rule often serves to defeat social policies implemented by
the imposition of at least some punishment, be it civil or criminal. The
rule also has a questionable legal foundation, since protection against
double jeopardy is traditionally unique to criminal proceedings and a
mere prayer for punitive damages is not a true jeopardy. In the event
the rule were abolished, the civil tort claimant and the state would pur-
sue their distinct interests as the merit of doing so dictated.
T, Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322, 325-26 (1854).
This solution could create the danger in jury trials that the evidence of a prior convic-
tion would prejudice the jury against the defendant. Rather than persuading the jury that
punitive damages are not appropriate, the evidence might actually convince the jury that
the defendant deserves further punishment in the form of punitive damages. Similar fears
have caused the courts to rule that evidence as to a prior conviction may not be used at
trial against a defendant. See, e.g., Hambey v. Hill, 148 Ind. App. 662, 269 N.E.2d 394 (1971);
Beene v. Gibralter Indus. Life Ins. Co., 116 Ind. App. 290, 63 N.E.2d 299 (1945).
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CONCLUSION
The laudable objective of the Taber rule, based on an established con-
stitutional and common law protection, is simply to prevent unneces-
sary or unwarranted punishment. However, this objective is not
achieved by a wholesale denial of the right of civil claimants to recover
punitive damages. The effect of the Taber rule is all too often to prevent
the imposition of any punishment for conduct which merits social op-
probrium. When this happens, there is no deterrent to future transgres-
sions. Both society at large and claimants victimized by demonstrably
malicious acts thereby suffer. Under these circumstances the double
jeopardy reasoning of the rule must be examined. The purpose of this
comment has been to welcome the invitation of recent appellate opin-
ions and make known a critical perspective of the rule. More welcome,
however, would be an examination by an Indiana court whose previous
decisions should not foreclose new consideration.
